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Large shareholders may play an important role for firm performance and policies, but identifying this
empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. We develop and test
an empirical framework which allows us to separate selection from treatment effects of large shareholders.
Individual blockholders tend to hold blocks in public firms located close to where they reside. Using
this empirical observation, we develop an instrument – the density of wealthy individuals near a firm’s
headquarters – for the presence of a large, non-managerial individual shareholder in a firm. These
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1. Introduction   
A public firm’s shareholders have extensive legal control rights in the corporation, but in practice 
much of this control is delegated to managers.  In companies with small, dispersed shareholders, owners 
may find it costly to coordinate and exercise monitoring and control, leaving management with 
considerable discretion. The resulting agency problems between owners and managers may be severe 
(e.g., Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976)).
1  By concentrating a block of shares in 
the hands of a single decision maker, large shareholders may play a beneficial role in remedying these 
agency problems and facilitating effective owner control (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1980) and Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986)).  A large shareholder may restrain managers from extracting rents and thereby 
improve firm performance, benefitting all shareholders.  Other theories predict that a block in a firm may 
be costly.  Large shareholders may, e.g., reduce the liquidity of a firm’s shares (because they make 
asymmetric information problems more severe), or influence firm policies in some way that is not in the 
interest of small shareholders (e.g. favoring tax-inefficient forms of cash distribution). 
Testing these theories about the effects of large owners is challenging. Researchers in corporate 
finance have recognized for more than 20 years (at least since Demsetz and Lehn (1985)) the difficulty of 
causal inference in studies of ownership and performance.  Suppose for example that blockholders 
systematically target firms with poor performance because of the potential performance increases due to 
improved monitoring, or that they select more liquid stocks because of the relatively lower cost of 
creating a block.  Suppose also, as predicted by theory, that conditional on such selection, blockholder 
monitoring improves operating profitability and reduces the liquidity of the firm’s shares.  If this is the 
case, then OLS regressions of performance or stock liquidity on block presence in a firm confound 
selection effects and treatment effects of block ownership.  In this paper, we develop and test a new 
instrumental variable framework which allows us to separate these effects for a large group of 
                                                      
1 There is a large literature on manager-shareholder conflicts.  Demsetz (1983) argues that a manager may extract 
non-pecuniary benefits to the detriment of shareholders.  Jensen (1986) and Jensen (1989) argue that managers 
expropriate small, dispersed shareholders by diverting corporate resources for empire building or perk consumption.     2
blockholders. This allows us to quantify the impact of large owners on several key aspects of firm 
behavior.    
Our analysis focuses on individual non-managerial blockholders and excludes, e.g., blocks held 
by mutual funds and other institutions.  This is motivated by the limitations of our identification strategy 
(i.e. what our instrument predicts), but is also appealing when testing predictions from theories of large 
shareholders. Non-management individuals who hold a large block of shares in a firm seem to naturally 
fit with the notion of having a principal present in the firm because they are generally less constrained 
than institutional investors from being active monitors of management.  They do not face the regulatory 
constraints of many mutual funds and pension funds (e.g., Black (1990) and Roe (1990)), they are not 
afraid of losing money management business (e.g., Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) and Davis and Kim 
(2007)), and they come with fewer agency problems of their own (e.g., Diamond (1984)).
2    Managers 
who are also blockholders have interests that may differ dramatically from that of other owners (see e.g. 
Barclay and Holderness (1989)). Thus, non-management individual blocks appear to fit well to theories of 
outside monitors. 
Our instrument for the presence of a large shareholder in a firm is the number of high net worth 
individuals in the state where a firm is headquartered divided by the number of public firms 
headquartered in the state, which we refer to as wealth density.
3  This variable is a valid instrument for the 
presence of blocks in local firms if it is correlated with the frequency of such blocks (relevancy condition) 
but impacts the dependent variables only through its effect on block ownership (exclusion restriction).  
Our instrument reflects economic forces important for the presence of a block in a firm.  The relevancy 
condition is easiest to evaluate. First, blockholders exhibit a preference for firms headquartered near 
                                                      
2 While institutions are not generally active owners, some institutions are more active than others. There is evidence 
from the 1980s and early 1990s that some public pension funds, e.g., CalPERS, were active in corporate governance 
(e.g., Smith (1996) and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999)).  Also, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008) compare 
firms before and after an activist hedge fund accumulates a stake and find significant changes in performance and 
firm policies.   
3 To the best of our knowledge, there is no database available that reliably captures U.S. wealth distribution on a 
finer scale than state level (such as Metropolitan Statistical Areas).   3
where they live, presumably because of lower monitoring costs or asymmetric information.
4  The median 
distance between a non-managerial individual blockholder and the firm in which they have a block is 42.5 
miles.  Second, personal wealth is likely a determinant of an individual’s ability to invest a large stake in 
a public firm.  Finally, there is significant cross-state variation in the wealth density instrument, possibly 
reflecting exogenously attractive areas or the fact that wealthy people prefer to live near other wealthy 
individuals because of social reasons or similar tastes (e.g., Glaeser (1998)).  We find that our instrument 
predicts the presence of a block in a firm with considerable power.  The economic magnitude of the 
estimated effect is large: moving from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile wealth density increases the predicted 
probability of a block in a local firm from 8.7 percent to 12.8 percent, i.e., it increases the probability by 
about 50 percent.   
While there is no statistical test of the validity of the exclusion restriction in the presence of a 
single instrument, we provide several empirical observations and arguments to support its validity.  First, 
our instrument comes from inheritance data, i.e., deceased wealthy individuals, so it reflects “old money”, 
limiting the impact of local wealth-creating events such as initial public offerings of local firms, which 
may directly affect current firm performance and policies.  Second, if wealth density was correlated with 
firm-specific variables measuring the demand for a block in a firm, we would expect it to also predict the 
presence of blocks other than non-managerial individual blocks. We find that wealth density does not 
predict the presence of blocks by managers or institutional investors.  We return to a more detailed 
discussion of the validity of our instrument in Section 4.4.   
Our empirical evidence is consistent with theories of large shareholders as monitors of 
management.  We find that blocks are not randomly allocated to firms, but large shareholders 
systematically target firms based on where the benefits from additional monitoring are expected to be 
more significant, e.g., smaller and relatively poorly performing firms.  Controlling for such block 
selection, we find that the presence of a large shareholder significantly reduces a firm’s investments, 
                                                      
4 See Lerner (1995) for evidence on local bias among venture capitalists, Coval and Moskowitz (1999), (2001) for 
mutual funds, and Bailey, Kumar and Ng (2008) for retail investors.     4
reduces corporate cash holdings, increases payouts to shareholders, reduces total top-executive pay, and 
increases firm performance.  Firms with blockholders also have significantly more outside directors on 
their boards.  In addition to monitoring benefits we also find that block presence comes with some costs.  
One such cost is less liquid publicly traded shares. This may reflect a smaller float as well as the presence 
of privately informed traders (i.e., the blockholders).   
The paper contributes to existing research on large shareholders’ impact on firms by explicitly 
addressing the endogeneity of the ownership structure.    In his survey, Holderness (2003) emphasizes 
endogeneity problems in analyzing block ownership and concludes that “[s]urprisingly few major 
corporate decisions have been shown to be different in the presence of a blockholder” (p. 60).  
Controlling for selection effects dramatically changes our inference about block impact on firm behavior. 
We show that large shareholders indeed play a large role for corporate governance in large public U.S. 
firms, and can have large effects on several firm policies.  For example, large shareholders target firms 
with poor performance, but conditional on doing so, they improve performance, consistent with 
monitoring theories of blockholders.  In addition to effects on performance, we test for a large 
shareholder’s impact on corporate policies, many of which have not been previously analyzed, and we 
find evidence consistent with blockholder monitoring causing changes in these policies.  On the other 
hand, capital structure does not appear much affected by large shareholders. In general, our findings are 
consistent with the interpretation that firms in areas with a relatively low supply of potential block holders 
display the characteristics of firms with more severe agency problems between owners and managers.  
For three reasons, there are no clear policy implications of our findings. First, because large 
shareholders and small shareholders do not necessarily have coinciding preferences about firm policy, 
behavioral changes that benefit one may not benefit the other. Encouraging block formation may not be 
beneficial on net. Second, our results are limited to non-institutional outsiders, which are scarce, and 
difficult to produce. Blocks held by mutual funds and other institutions (which can more easily be grown) 
may have very different impact on firms. Finally, the potential impact of blockholder is likely different   5
across different individuals and firms. The firms where we observe blockholders are likely to be the ones 
where the potential benefits are the largest. 
The second contribution of our paper is to show that the local supply of potential blockholders 
(i.e., the local supply of one potentially important governance mechanism) in the area where a firm is 
headquartered may have significant effects on firm behavior, i.e. that geography matters for the 
ownership structure of firms (see Coval and Moskowitz (1999) for related patterns for institutional stock 
ownership). We use these patterns to empirically model the supply side of large shareholders. This allows 
us to examine whether ownership structure impacts firms’ behavior, controlling for selection effects.  The 
economics of the supply of blocks is largely unexplored in the governance literature, perhaps because the 
focus has mainly been on partial equilibrium analysis and results (see, however, Gorton and Kahl (2008) 
for a recent exception).   
Our paper also relates to work in corporate governance which attempts to address endogeneity 
problems. Coles, Lemmon, and Wang (2008) and Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2005) develop 
structural models of finance and governance, which on theory can allow econometricians to estimate 
underlying parameters. Several papers in this area use natural experiments generated by legal changes, 
including Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) (changes in antitakeover laws) and Pérez-González (2005) 
(the abolishment of foreign majority ownership regulations in Mexico).  Several papers use the passage of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an exogenous change (e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and Hochberg, 
Sapienza and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007)).  See also Hochberg and Lindsey (2009) who use a labor-based 
instrument in a corporate finance context, and Kedia and Rajgopal (2009), who find that option grants 
vary geographically. In contrast to these papers, we develop an instrumental variable for the incidence of 
large, private shareholders  in a firm.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the role of large shareholders in the 
governance of public corporations.  Section 3 describes our data.  Section 4 defines the instrument, 
describes the econometric model that we use to identify and quantify the impact of blocks on firms, and   6
examines the validity of the instrument.  Section 5 analyzes the impact of large shareholders on firm 
performance and corporate policies using our two-stage selection model.  Section 6 concludes.   
2. Large Shareholders and Corporate Governance  
2.1. Monitoring and the effects of large shareholders  
Theory suggests that large shareholder monitoring may have a significant impact on several 
aspects of firm behavior, including a firm’s operating profitability, corporate investment policy, and 
choice of financial and executive compensation policies.  In this section, we review theories of large 
shareholders and discuss the empirical predictions which we test in the remainder of the paper. 
Theories with a beneficial view of large shareholders typically start by positing agency problems 
between owners and managers, and by assuming that large owners are able to reduce these. Due to the 
size of their stake, they either have better incentives to monitor or more power to influence decisions than 
small, dispersed owners.
5   
Large shareholders use their influence over firm behavior in several ways. They may affect 
operating decisions by monitoring management.  This can result in improved project selection and 
investment levels, and possibly reduced waste.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that blockholder 
monitoring restrains managers from consuming firm resources, thereby improving performance.  Also, 
the presence of a block may mitigate overinvestment by management and improve the investment 
efficiency of the targeted firm (Jensen (1986)).  To test these predictions empirically, we examine the 
impact of large shareholders on measures of operating performance (e.g., ROA), costs (such as SG&A 
expenses), and investment behavior.   
Blockholders may also affect firms’ financial policies.  Again, the starting point of the argument 
is that managers may want to deviate from optimal capital structures (i.e. optimal in the view of owners).  
                                                      
5 Some recent theories argue that large shareholders can exert governance even if they do not intervene in a firm’s 
operations (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) and Edmans (2009)).     7
Managers may prefer lower leverage to reduce firm risk and protect their underdiversified human capital 
(e.g., Fama (1980)).  Alternatively, managers may prefer to increase leverage in order to inflate the voting 
power of their equity stakes (see Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988)).  In either case, there is a role 
for large shareholder monitoring related to capital structure decisions. In terms of payout policy and cash 
holdings, managers may prefer lower payouts as they reduce the amount of resources under 
management’s control and subject managers to capital markets discipline when the firm requires external 
financing (e.g., Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986)).  Monitoring by a large shareholder may restrict 
managers from reducing payouts or holding too much cash.   
CEO pay is perhaps the most obvious potential source of conflicts between management and 
owners. Whether CEOs are paid excessively and set their own pay is a question which has been subject to 
considerable debate and academic research (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (2004) for a review of this 
work).  Because large shareholders may restrain rent extraction by a firm’s CEO, we examine whether the 
presence of a block reduces CEO pay.   
2.2. The costs of large shareholders  
There are several potential costs of having a large owner.  For example, monitoring may reduce 
managerial initiative (e.g., Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997)).  Even when the presence of a block is ex 
post efficient, in the sense that the owner will improve investment decisions, the possibility of future 
intervention may reduce a manager’s ex ante incentive to exert effort and to search for value-increasing 
investment opportunities (in the Burkart et al. model, this happens because the manager will sometimes 
be overruled by active owners, reducing his utility).  The net effect of concentrated ownership, i.e. the 
benefits of monitoring versus the cost of reduced managerial incentives, is indeterminate. In the model, 
the net effect depends on the size of the monitoring shareholder’s stake. This theory thus predicts that the 
impact of blockholders on firm financial performance is ambiguous. 
Another potential cost of large shareholders is reduced liquidity in a firm’s publicly traded shares. 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) suggest that one cause of stock market illiquidity is the presence of privately   8
informed traders.    One such group of potentially informed traders is blockholders (especially in our 
sample, which precedes Regulation FD).  Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) model how concentrated 
ownership reduces incentives for information production in the stock market by reducing liquidity. Bhide 
(1993) argues that large shareholders who reduce agency problems by monitoring management may also 
reduce stock liquidity by increasing informational asymmetries. Based on these theoretical predictions, 
we test whether blocks impact the liquidity of a firm’s shares using measures of stock liquidity (e.g., 
Amihud’s illiquidity measure).   
Other theories argue that blockholder-liquidity causality might go in the opposite direction of the 
above arguments.  For example, Kahn and Winton (1998) model the choice to exit or monitor/intervene to 
improve firm performance, and predict that intervention is less likely when the firm’s stock is more liquid 
because of the lower cost of exit.  Maug (1998) argues that liquidity may reduce the cost of creating a 
block because it makes it less costly to purchase more shares, so we would expect more blocks in firms 
with more liquid stocks.  Our instrumental variables approach will allow us to test and isolate the causal 
effect of blocks on liquidity without selection effects confounding the estimates. Several theories 
explicitly consider the trade-offs that result from the simultaneous benefits and costs of large 
shareholders. For example, Bolton and von Thadden (1998) argue that large shareholders reduce the 
threat of takeovers.  
3. Data  
3.1. Data on large shareholders   
We analyze an unbalanced panel of large publicly traded U.S. corporations from 1996-2001. The 
sample consists of non-dual class S&P 1500 firms and was originally compiled by Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, 
Gompers and Metrick (2006) (DFGM) who identify a firm’s 5% blockholders, if any.
6  The raw database 
                                                      
6 Available from Wharton Research Data Services, http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu.  The use of annual data may 
underestimate the true number of large shareholders because some blockholders can enter and exit our panel within   9
contains 1,919 different firms, 18,818 blockholder-firm-year observations, and approximately 7,600 firm-
year observations.
7  We exclude financial firms and utilities, which reduces the sample to approximately 
6,000 firm-year observations.  Firms are included in our sample whether or not they have any large 
shareholder.   
We define a large shareholder as a non-managerial individual blockholder if it meets both of the 
following criteria.  First, an individual has the sole voting power of the block.  Second, this individual is 
neither a current nor a former officer of the firm (e.g., we exclude Bill Gates’ block in Microsoft).  We 
identify current and former officers through proxy statements and a Dow Jones Interactive news search.  
We exclude holdings by current and former officers’ spouses or trusts (e.g., the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Trust).  We exclude blocks held by second generation family members only if a family member is an 
officer (e.g., the block by the Hewlett and Packard families is included as the family has non-executive 
directorships but none of the family members are officers of HP).  Our dataset contains 715 firm-year 
observations with at least one non-managerial individual blockholder.   
3.2. The location of large shareholders 
We obtain data on the geographic location (zip code) of each block in our sample from firms’ 
proxy statements.  We exclude blocks located abroad.  For some individuals who are officers or directors, 
the proxy statements do not give an address, but state “Same address as company”.  We thus 
underestimate the actual distance between the location of some individuals and firm headquarters.  Also, 
when individuals have multiple residences, we use the one reported in the proxy.  We obtain zip codes of 
firm headquarters from the Execucomp database, the Compact Disclosure discs, or hand-collect them 
from proxy statements.  Finally, we identify the latitude and longitude of each blockholder and firm by 
matching the zip codes to data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer Place and Zip Code Database.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
a year, thus not showing up in firms’ proxy statements.  If some large shareholders choose to own a stake below the 
5% reporting threshold, they also do not show up in the proxy statements and in the DFGM database.   
7 The database has 20,975 blockholder entries.  However, not all of these entries are 5% blockholders.  For example, 
“Karen Smith” and “Peter Smith” are recorded in the raw data, but they jointly hold shares through the “Smith 
Family Trust.”  Conditioning on the final blockholder flag in the DFGM database will eliminate Karen Smith and 
Peter Smith, and retain only the Smith Family Trust.     10
We compute the distance (in miles) from a blockholder to each of its firms’ headquarters using 
the methodology of Coval and Moskowitz (1999).  Table 1 reports a mean distance of 385.4 miles and a 
small median distance of 28.5 miles for non-managerial individual blockholders.  More than half (61%) 
are located in the same state as the firm in which they hold a block.  Not surprisingly, the median distance 
between blockholder residence and firm headquarters for managerial blocks is zero and more than 90% of 
all managerial large shareholders are located in the same state as the corporate headquarters.  The results 
are significantly different for institutional investors.  The median distance between mutual fund (money 
manager) headquarters and the headquarters of the firms in which they own large stakes is 1,158 miles 
(871 miles).  Less than 10% of all mutual fund and money manager headquarters are located in the same 
state as the corporate headquarters of their block investments.  
3.3. Geographic data 
Our data for the geographic distribution of high net worth individuals are from the Statistics of 
Income (SOI) program at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
8  It reports the number of high net worth 
individuals in each state, estimated from estate tax return filings.  The SOI reports estimates of the 
number of high net-worth individuals by state in 1995, 1998 and 2001 as well as their estimated average 
wealth.  The definition of high net worth varies somewhat from year to year.  In 1995, it is net wealth of 
$0.6 to $10 million (in terms of counting the total number of high net worth individuals, the upper cutoff 
makes a minor difference).  In 1998 and 2001, the lower limit is $1 million and there is no upper limit.  
However, the three cross-sections are very similar.  We use 1995 data because they predate the block 
observations in our sample, but we have also used 1995 data for 1996-1998 and 1998 data for 1999-2001, 
as well as 1998 data for all years, with very small differences in results.   
We also collect several control variables that vary at the state level.  We obtain education, 
population and income data from the Census Bureau.  We collect corporate income tax rates for 2000 (we 
                                                      
8 For details, see IRS, Statistics of Income Bulletin, Winter 2002-2003, Publication 1136 (Rev. 4-2003).   11
have used other years as well) from various sources.  When there are multiple brackets we use the rates 
applying for highest income levels.   
3.4. Firm variables   
The theories of large shareholders discussed in Section 2 predict that large shareholders can 
impact a broad set of corporate decisions:   
(i) Operating performance.  We analyze return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS).  We 
also analyze cost cutting policy (scaled SG&A expenses) and investments (scaled capital 
expenditures).   
(ii) Capital structure.  We analyze measures of book and market leverage.   
(iii) Resources and payout policy.  We analyze total payout as a fraction of EBITDA and cash  
holdings.    
(iv) Managerial compensation and board structure.  We analyze the log of total CEO pay and the 
fraction of pay in equity.  We also analyze the number of outside directors on the board.   
(v) Liquidity.  We analyze trading volume and the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002).   
Our data source for annual accounting variables is Compustat.  We exclude observations with 
explanatory variables in the top and bottom 1%, but we have also used winsorizing at the 1% level with 
very small differences in results.  Our data sources for CEO compensation and board structure are the 
Execucomp database and the IRRC director database, respectively.  The data used to calculate the 
liquidity measures come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  All variables are 
defined in Appendix A.   
Table 2 reports summary statistics.  Panel A shows that there exists at least one non-managerial 
individual block in 11.8% of all firm-year observations.  A manager (either current or former) holds a 
block in 21.9% of all firm-year observations.  More than two-thirds of all sample observations have at   12
least one large mutual fund shareholder. Panel B reports means, medians, and standard deviations for the 
variables we use in Section 5.
9   
4. Instrument and empirical methodology   
4.1. The instrumental variable 
We define our instrument, the density of high net worth individuals, as the number of high net 
worth individuals in 1995 divided by the total number of firms headquartered in a state, using the 1995 
SOI data and information on firm headquarters from the Compustat database.  Throughout the analysis, 
we normalize the measure so that it is measured in units of thousands of individuals per firm headquarter. 
The significant geographic variation in the density of high net worth individuals is illustrated in 
Figure 1. States with a large number of high net worth individuals, e.g., California, will not necessarily 
have the highest density measure when a large number of firms are also headquartered in that state.  
Across states, the median wealth density is 565 (Oklahoma), and he mean is 664.  Of the top five states in 
terms of number of headquarters, California has a density of 442, Texas 299, New York 473, Florida 603 
and Massachusetts 270.  Across sample firms, the mean density is 460 individuals per firm and the 
standard deviation is 151.   
4.2. Estimated wealth distributions   
Substantial personal wealth is required to buy a 5% or larger stake in one of the firms in our 
sample.  Our data on high net worth individuals counts many wealthy people who do not in fact have the 
resources to buy a 5% stake in most (or any) listed firms. Is our variable informative about the very top of 
the wealth distribution? Also, are there enough wealthy individuals to explain the observed frequency and 
size of the stakes we classify as individually held? To assess whether the number and wealth of high net 
worth individuals are large enough to be consistent with the value of blocks in our sample, we have to 
                                                      
9 The number of blockholders in Table B1 does not correspond to those in Table 1, because Table 1 is the raw 
database and allows for more than one large shareholder per firm-year.   13
extrapolate from wealthy to very wealthy individuals. The extrapolation, using the power law distribution 
of individual wealth, suggests that high net-worth individuals have resources that would allow them as a 
group, to hold a 5% of public equity, in most states. We provide more details in Appendix B. 
4.3. Two-stage selection model  
Most of the existing empirical literature in corporate finance on the economic effects of large 
shareholders has estimated an equation of the following form:   
  it it t i j it it X d y           ) (  (1) 
where i, and t index firms, and years, respectively and j(i) indicates the industry to which firm i belongs.  
it y  is a firm performance or corporate policy variable,  ) (i j   are industry fixed effects,  t   are year fixed 
effects, and  it X  is a vector of time-varying firm-level controls, e.g., the size or age of the firm.   it d  is an 
indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a large shareholder is present in firm i in year t, and 0 otherwise.   
It is not possible to draw causal inferences about impact of blockholders on firm behavior from 
estimates of   in equation (1), because there are economic reasons to expect that blocks are not randomly 
allocated to firms.  For example, firm size or growth options are potential determinants of corporate 
policy choices and firm performance, but the same variables may also be correlated with the presence of a 
large shareholder.  If  it X  does not include all relevant variables, the large shareholder indicator variable 
it d  will be correlated with the error term in equation (1), and OLS estimates of   will be biased.  For 
example, if the selection and treatment effects go in opposite directions,   will be biased towards zero.   
To explicitly address this endogeneity problem, we use a two-stage selection model, following 
Heckman and Robb (1985).  The model we estimate differs from standard two-stage least squares (TSLS) 
models because of the binary nature of the endogenous variable of interest (the presence of a block).  As 
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where  * it d  is a latent variable and  it w  is our instrument, i.e., the number of high net worth individuals 
per firm headquarter in a state.   ) (i j a  are industry fixed effects,  t c  are year fixed effects, and  it X  is a 
vector of firm-level control variables.  We report estimates of the first stage using both linear probability 
models and probit models.
10   
In the second stage, firm performance or corporate policies are modeled and it is assessed how 
they are affected by the predicted probability of block presence in a firm.  The second stage equation is: 
  it it t j it Block it X d y           ˆ  (3) 
Since the only endogenous variable in equation (3) is an indicator variable, this model is sometimes 
referred to as a “dummy endogenous variable model” (Heckman (1978)).  The vector of control variables, 
it X , is identical to the one included in the first stage.  We assume that  it e  and  it   follow a joint normal 
distribution with a correlation coefficient of .  The model is estimated by maximizing the joint likelihood 
function (see also Maddala (1983)).
11  The estimated coefficient  Block   captures the treatment effect of a 
large shareholder on yit.   
If the error terms  it e  and  it   are uncorrelated ( = 0), then the effect of large shareholders on 
firm performance or corporate policies can be consistently estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS).  
If is positive, then the coefficient   estimated through OLS is overstated; if  is negative, then it will be 
understated.  We test whether is zero with a Chi-square test which is reported in all tables.   
                                                      
10 Similar model specifications have recently been estimated in the corporate finance literature (see, e.g., Li and 
Prabhala (2007).  Our specification with a first stage probit (and a variable in the first stage which is not included in 
the second stage), is similar to the treatment effects model estimated in Villalonga and Amit (2006).   
11 The MLE model requires the assumption of joint normality of the error terms. An alternative approach would be 
to model the first stage as a probit model and then use traditional instrumental variable techniques where the IV is 
created from the probit fitted first stage values.  We have also estimated these regressions, and the overall results 
from the probit-IV regressions are similar in significance and magnitude to our reported MLE results.    15
4.4. Validity of the instrument 
4.4.1.  Relevancy condition  
The first condition for wealth density to be a valid instrument is that it significantly predicts the 
presence of large non-managerial individual shareholders in local firms.  There are economic reasons to 
expect such a relation.  First, we found above that blockholders exhibit a preference for firms 
headquartered near where they live.  Second, we also found that there is significant geographic variation 
in the density of wealthy individuals.  This is important because personal wealth is likely a key 
determinant of an individual’s ability to accumulate a large equity stake in a public firm.   
It is important to run regressions of block presence on wealth density with firm- and state-level 
controls to rule out the possibility that our instrument is correlated with some firm-level determinant of 
blocks such as firm size or state level variables such as corporate tax rates.  But the simplest way to assess 
the validity of the relevancy condition is to collapse data by state.  Figure 3 plots the frequency with 
which firms in a state have a large individual non-management shareholder against our instrument.  Each 
state is represented by a circle whose area is determined by the number of firms used to calculate the state 
block frequency.
12  States that are large in terms of firms, such as California and Texas, appear large (918 
and 649 observations, respectively).  On the other hand, South Dakota (the low outlier just below 1.5 on 
the x-axis) or Iowa (the high outlier with block frequency around 55%) are small (six and 40 
observations, respectively).  The graph shows an estimated regression line where observations have been 
weighted by the number of firms used in calculating the frequency (i.e. the circle sizes).  The estimated 
slope is 0.190 (heteroskedasticity-robust standard error of 0.05; t-statistic of 3.77).  
                                                      
12 The block frequency is an average across our sample years to maximize the number of observations used to 
calculate the average. Using only the 1996 cross-section of blocks and firms increases the significance and estimated 
slope.    16
4.4.2.  Exclusion restriction  
The second condition for our instrument’s validity is that it impacts the dependent variables only 
through its effect on the endogenous block variable, i.e., wealth density must not affect the dependent 
variables directly, and not through any other mechanism.  That is, the correlation between the instrument 
and the second stage error term must be zero.  The validity of this condition cannot be tested 
econometrically with only a single instrument, but we provide several empirical observations and 
arguments to support its validity.   
One concern may be that areas with wealthy individuals experienced recent wealth creation (e.g., 
Microsoft executives in the State of Washington) so that there is a direct effect of firm performance on 
wealth density, or potentially reverse causality.  Three arguments alleviate this concern.  Our instrument 
reflects “old money” because it is based on inheritance data, and is not related to contemporaneous firm 
performance and recent IPOs, which reduces concerns of reverse causality with firm performance.  Also, 
our block variable does not include executives (current or former officers), i.e., those most likely to have 
wealth created in IPOs and through superior firm performance.  In addition, we measure our wealth 
density instrument with a lag, i.e., prior to our sample period, and while our instrument is measured at the 
state-level, we examine performance and policies at the firm-level.   
Second, while the density of high net worth individuals predicts individual non-managerial 
blocks, it does not predict the presence of large shareholdings by either managers or institutional 
investors.  It therefore seems unlikely that our instrument measures the “demand for blocks”.  If it did, we 
would expect wealth density to predict the presence of several different types of blocks, and not only non-
managerial individual blocks.   
Third, it appears unlikely that location choices of firms and individuals are motivated by the 
market for blocks in listed firms.  Firm headquarter relocations are extremely rare events.  Pirinsky and 
Wang (2006) identify only 115 relocations among more than 5,000 firms between 1992 and 1997.    17
Therefore, firm locations must typically be determined by early decisions that long pre-date the 
ownership structure in the very large firms in our sample.  
Wealthy individuals are presumably more mobile. Various agglomeration economies affect 
location choices (see e.g., Puga and Duranton (2004) or Glaeser (2008) and the references therein). 
Wealthy people likely want to live near other wealthy individuals for social reasons and because they 
have correlated tastes.  Such agglomeration seems consistent with the apparent concentration of wealthy 
people (New York’s Upper East Side, Aspen, Beverly Hills, East Hampton), and is not primarily about 
the production side of the economy, but about the consumption side, because that is where the major 
externalities are (this is unlike location choices of the middle class, where productivity externalities may 
dominate).  In particular, expectations about future policies (e.g., leverage or payout policy) in local firms 
are probably less likely to figure much in location decisions of wealthy individuals.  Thus, we do not 
believe endogenous firm or individual/block location choices affect our results to a significant extent.   
Finally, because we study a very broad set of corporate policies, any theory of a direct relation 
between wealth density and a particular policy also has to explain a large number of relationships, i.e., 
both the relation between wealth density and block presence and the one with all the dependent variables.  
We are aware of no economic theory which predicts a direct relation between wealth density and the 
multitude of dependent variables we study.  
4.5. Other econometric issues  
If instrumental variables are insufficiently correlated with endogenous variables, identification 
with IV suffers from “weak instrument problem” (e.g., Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), Nelson and 
Startz (1990), and Staiger and Stock (1997)).  Weak instruments may lead to IV coefficient estimates that 
are biased toward OLS coefficients, and to confidence intervals that are understated.  The problem of 
weak instruments is serious in settings with a large number of instruments, which are individually weakly 
correlated with the endogenous variable(s), but which as a group are able to explain some of its variation 
(see, e.g., Angrist, Imbens and Krueger (1999)).  When the number of instruments is low, however, IV   18
results are neither particularly biased nor generate excess precision.  Given this and the fact that we use a 
single instrument, weak instrument bias should not be a concern in our regressions.
13  
The impact of large shareholders is likely to vary across firms and owners. Our results should be 
interpreted with this in mind.  With homogenous effects (conditional on the control variables), 
performance and corporate policies will be similarly affected by a large shareholder across all firms. In 
that case, the second stage large shareholder coefficients we estimate can be interpreted as the effect for 
any firm with a large shareholder, including the majority of firms who do not actually have such a 
shareholder.  If the homogeneity assumption does not hold, however, our regressions estimate the average 
impact of blocks across a subset of firms that actually have such blocks.  Specifically, our estimates 
reflect the mean effect for those firms that have a large shareholder because they are located in states with 
a high wealth density measure.
14  It seems highly likely that the homogeneity assumption is unwarranted, 
and that our estimated effects are local, i.e., they would not generally represent the average effect of 
blocks across the universe of firms.  Two forms of heterogeneity may be important. First, the potential 
impact of a blockholder likely varies across firms, for example because other governance mechanisms are 
in place in some firms but not others, or simply because some firms are well run and some less so.  Our 
estimated effects therefore have to be thought of as average effects for those firms which are marginal 
targets, i.e., neither the most obvious targets (because those firms have blocks in all states), nor the firms 
with the lowest potential impact of a block (because those firms do not have blockholders even in states 
with very high wealth density). We estimate average effects across many policies, so there may be larger 
effects in a subset of firms with blocks.
15 Second, different blocks are probably formed for different 
                                                      
13 Following Staiger and Stock (1997), it is common practice to examine the strength of the instrument in the first 
stage using F-statistics.  Based on cut-off values of Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) and Stock and Yogo (2005) and 
using the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test statistic that allows for clustered standard errors, we can reject the null 
hypothesis of weak instruments in all our reported first-stage regressions. 
14 For further discussion, see Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Imbens, Angrist and Rubin (1996).  
15 We may miss potential effects of blockholders if heterogeneity leads to effects of opposite signs (see, e.g., 
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2008)). If blockholders increase leverage in some firms but reduce it in others, the 
estimated net effect might be indistinguishable from zero. While perhaps possible for leverage, this possibility seems   19
reasons, e.g., to force management to raise leverage, to solidify a commercial relationship, to contain 
some agency problem, or to force a change in strategy. We only estimate averages, so effects of blocks 
that are infrequent may not be visible with our methodology.  If the effects are in the tails (e.g., blocks 
reduce excessive leverage but do not affect non-excessive leverage), then our specifications may also 
report small effects (or none).  
5. Results  
5.1. Wealth density and the presence of a large shareholder in a firm  
We start by reporting results from the first stage regression, in which we predict the presence of a 
non-managerial individual blockholder in a firm.  Table 3 reports several model specifications.  We find 
that the density of wealthy individuals in a state significantly predicts the presence of a large shareholder 
in firms headquartered in that state.  In all regressions predicting the presence of a non-managerial block, 
our instrumental variable’s t-statistics are significant at the 1%-level.  The heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are clustered by state.  In unreported regressions, we have clustered standard errors by 
firm and estimate consistently smaller standard errors for the instrument.   
A linear probability model of having a non-managerial individual block estimated by ordinary 
least squares (OLS) is reported in column (1). The estimated coefficient on the density of high net worth 
individuals, 0.190, implies that a one standard deviation increase in the instrument (0.420) is predicted to 
increase the probability of having a block by 7.6 percentage points.
 16  This effect is large compared to the 
unconditional mean probability of 11.8%. Because block probabilities are close to zero for most firms, the 
linear probability model is possibly a poor modeling choice and we therefore turn to other model 
specifications.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
less likely for, e.g., profits or liquidity.  In any case, this suggests that there may be more effects of large 
shareholders than we identify, but does not suggest ever finding any effects spuriously. 
16 This standard deviation of the instrument is calculated across 50 states. Calculating the standard deviation across 
firms yields a lower number (0.151) because few firms are located in the states with extreme wealth densities.  An 
increase in the density of 0.151 increases the predicted probability of a block by 1.5 percentage points according to 
column one.   20
In column (2), we estimate probit regressions. Our previous finding that block presence in a firm 
is significantly predicted by the density of local wealth is robust and does not change across 
specifications. Around the sample mean probability of having a block, the effect of increasing the density 
by one standard deviation is to increase the block probability by about 4.5 percentage points, a 38% 
increase.  That is, the magnitude of the effect remains large in this model. In column (3), time-varying 
firm controls, as well as year and industry-fixed effects are included.
17 The estimated effect of the 
instrument is slightly lower, but remains significant at the 1%-level. This regression corresponds closely 
to the first stage estimation used to identify the effect of blockholders on a range of dependent variables 
below. Size has a negative correlation with block probabilities, and age and sales growth have positive 
correlations. 
In the remaining columns of Table 3, we report robustness checks and placebo tests.  First, we 
consider alternative ways of defining the instrument and dependent variable. In column (4), we replace 
the numerator of the wealth density measure (the number of wealthy individuals) with the total wealth 
held by these individuals, thus incorporating information on the high net worth individuals’ average 
wealth (based on data from the 1995 SOI).  At the sample mean, a one standard deviation increase in the 
wealth per listed firm variable increases the predicted probability of having a block by ten percent. In 
column (5), the dependent variable is the percent of common stock owned by individual shareholders with 
large blocks, adding up across blocks if there is more than one such block (18% of the firms with 
individually held blocks have more than one such block, most often two). Since this is a continuous 
variable, the regression is estimated with OLS. The coefficient on the density variable is highly 
significant and predicts that a one standard deviation increase in the instrument results in a 0.96% 
increase in the average fraction of shares held by large individuals shareholders (the unconditional 
average is 1.79% of shares). We conclude from the tests reported so far that there is a robust effect of 
                                                      
17 Industries are based on Fama and French (1997).  We have checked that our results are similar when using 2-digit 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industries.     21
local wealth on individually held blocks in local firms, across various ways of measuring both wealth and 
ownership, and controlling for important firm level variables.
 18 
It is important for our identification not just that the instrument predicts individual blocks, but 
also that it does not predict the presence of other types of blocks (some small negative effect is to be 
expected, since the ownerships shares of all owner categories add up to one). If it did, we might be 
concerned that any effects we identify might reflect those other owners.  In column (6), we report a probit 
specification with a dummy for the presence of a managerial blockholder as the dependent variable.  The 
coefficient on the instrument is positive, but insignificant. Age does not seem to be related to having a 
mutual fund-owned block, but profitability has a large positive coefficient. Column (7) shows a negative, 
but statistically insignificant, effect of the instrument on the propensity to have a block owned by a 
mutual fund or money manager.  
There are two important conclusions from Table 3.  First, non-managerial individual blocks are 
not randomly allocated to firms, but economic mechanisms systematically affect block allocations.  For 
example, large shareholders select smaller and older firms with poor past performance, but which have 
significant growth in their sales.  Conditional on firm size, firm age is positively correlated with the 
presence of a blockholder in a firm, suggesting that non-managerial individuals do not invest in the 
youngest firms.  These are characteristics of firms where the agency problems between owners and 
managers may be particularly severe.  One interpretation is that the evidence so far is consistent with 
economic theories of large shareholders as monitors, and that blocks are systematically allocated to firms 
based on where the demand for monitoring is more significant. In particular, our instrument strongly 
predicts the presence of a large individual shareholder. Meanwhile, the placebo tests suggest that our 
instrument is not identifying a set of firms with more blockholders in general, but very specifically 
                                                      
18 As a further robustness check, in unreported regressions, we have used the log of the number of high net worth 
individuals and the log of the number of firms as separate independent variables, or the number of high net worth 
individuals per capita and the number of firms per capita. Both variables are always significant of opposite sign and 
similar magnitudes.   22
predicts the presence of individually held blocks. Other block types are, if anything, less common when 
there are many local high net worth individuals.  
Second, causal inference regarding the impact of blocks of shares on firms is not possible from 
standard econometric models such as equation (1) and OLS.  Because several of the variables which 
explain the presence of a blockholder in a firm (e.g., past performance, firm size) can also be expected to 
play a role in explaining firm performance and policy choices in the second stage regressions, standard 
models will confound selection and treatment effects of blocks.  For example, we find that large 
shareholders select firms with relatively poor recent past performance, but conditional on such selection, 
we expect blockholders to improve performance through monitoring of management.  This is precisely 
why it is important to use an instrument when quantifying the impact of block presence on firms.   
5.2. State-level control variables  
Because the variation in our instrument comes from state-level differences, a concern is that we 
so far have captured differences across states that are correlated with blockholder presence but have 
nothing to do with the economic explanation we provide.  If a variable is both a determinant of block 
presence and correlated with our wealth density measure, our identification is not valid.  Therefore, we re-
estimate the first stage with controls which may be correlated with blocks: population density, the state-
level corporate tax rate, per capita income, and educational attainment.   
Table 4 shows that none of these state-level control variables significantly predict the presence of 
a non-managerial individual blockholder in a firm.  Also, the inclusion of state-level control variables 
does not affect the estimated effect of our instrument much.  Columns (1) – (4) include the state-level 
controls one by one.  In column (5), which includes all the state-level controls, we find that the estimated 
coefficient on wealth density is 0.626 and statistically significant at the 5%-level.  That is, measures of 
economic performance or the quality of the labor force in a state do not seem to explain our evidence.     23
5.3. Empirical analysis of the effects of large shareholders  
5.3.1.  Firm performance  
Table 5 reports evidence on the effect of large shareholders on performance.  Column (1) 
estimates effects for ROA.  Age, sales growth and dividend yield have positive coefficients, while age 
squared has a negative coefficient.
19 The coefficient on the instrumented block indicator variable is 0.037, 
significant at the 10%-level.  This implies a predicted 3.7 percentage points higher profitability, all else 
equal, with the presence of a large shareholder in a firm.  The magnitude of this effect is large given that 
the mean ROA is 4.7%.  However, the second-stage regression estimates a coefficient for the predicted 
probability of having a large non-managerial individual shareholder as opposed to the existence of a large 
shareholder.  Therefore, the magnitude of the second-stage coefficient measures the difference between a 
firm that is predicted to have a large shareholder with certainty and one that is predicted with certainty to 
not have a large shareholder.
20  It is important to note that the relatively large profit effect estimated here 
is identified from the marginal firm having a block when our instrument is high, but not if it were low, 
and that these firms may see larger improvements from having a block than the general population of 
firms. We cannot use the 0.037 coefficient to predict that if we added an individual non-managerial block 
to the 88% of sample firms which do not have one, they would experience an average ROA improvement 
of 3.7%. This effect is effectively estimated for  firms where there is a marginal block which would have 
been absent if the firm was in a state with fewer wealthy individuals.   
The estimated correlation coefficient of the error terms in the first and second stage equations is 
negative (-0.193) and statistically significant at the 5%-level.  That is, there is a systematic inverse 
relation between the unexplained (based on our model in the first stage) probability of having a block in a 
                                                      
19 We include the dividend yield and dividend payer dummy in the reported specification for profitability, following 
Fama and French (2000).  Payout policy is potentially endogenous and affected by large shareholders.  We find that 
the statistical significance of the block indicator variable is somewhat stronger if we exclude the dividend variables 
from the ROA and ROS specifications.   
20 For a less extreme effect, one may multiply the estimated coefficient with, e.g., the interquartile range of the 
distribution of predicted probabilities (0.16).  For expositional clarity, we discuss our results in Section 5.3 as 
moving from a probability of a large block of 0 to a probability of a large block of 1.     24
firm and the unexplained part from our operating performance regression model.  An economic 
interpretation of this result is that large shareholders tend to target firms with relatively poor operating 
performance, holding other firm-level variables constant.   
In column (2) of Table 5, we replace ROA with ROS (profits scaled by sales). The impact of 
large shareholders is robust and remains positive and significant (this time at the 1%-level).  Again, the 
effect appears economically large. 
There are several potential explanations for a positive block impact on profitability and firm cash 
flows.
21  We study two of the most straightforward ones: cost reduction and investment policy.  In column 
(3), we find that SG&A expenditures, a measure of cost cutting, do not seem to be significantly impacted 
by blocks.  In column (4), we find that investments (scaled capex) of firms are lower by around 7% of 
assets in the presence of a block, with a coefficient significant at the 5%-level.  This can be compared to 
mean investment of 28% of assets. The estimated error term correlation between the first and second 
stage equations is positive, suggesting that large shareholders select firms that invest more.   
The evidence in Table 5 is consistent with theories of large shareholders as monitors.  First, 
theory predicts that blockholders may monitor and restrain management from consuming firm resources 
(e.g., Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986)), thereby improving return on assets and 
other operating performance measures.  Blockholders target poorly performing firms, but conditional on 
such selection, they have a positive impact on profitability.
22  We also infer that the positive effect of 
                                                      
21 It is important to note that we do not develop a unified theory or model from which we can derive testable 
implications for all of our empirical tests at once. Hence, while our instrumental variable specification will enable us 
to determine a causal effect of blockholders on different corporate policies, we will not be able with certainty to say 
whether such an effect moves the firm towards a global optimum (across leverage, payout, etc.). See e.g.  Coles, 
Lemmon, and Meschke (2005) and Coles, Lemmon, and Wang (2008) who specify a structural model and use it to 
look at whether governance characteristics bring firms closer to the first-best solution, at the cost of having to settle 
on a narrower set of policies. 
22 Our evidence complements existing evidence on blocks from event studies.  For example, Holderness and 
Sheehan (1985) report that the stock market reacts positively to the announcement of block presence in a firm by six 
controversial so-called “raiders.”  Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987) study block trades more generally and 
find that price effects are permanent for buyer-initiated transactions, but temporary for seller-initiated transactions.  
Barclay and Holderness (1991) study negotiated block trades (mainly corporate blocks) and find that stock price 
increases are larger when the new blockholder achieves control.  Slovin and Sushka (1993) find that the sale of a 
large inside block to an outside blockholder triggered by the death of an insider leads to positive announcement 
returns..     25
blockholder presence in a firm empirically must dominate the reduction in managerial incentives effect 
identified by Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997).  One economic source through which large 
shareholders seem to systematically affect firm performance is improved investment efficiency.  
Blockholders target firms which invest more than otherwise similar firms, but then the large shareholders 
work to reduce the overall capital expenditure of these firms by restricting management from 
overinvesting, i.e., selecting and investing in projects with lower returns than their respective cost of 
capital.   
5.3.2.  Capital structure 
There is a role for large shareholders to monitor leverage choices because theory predicts that 
managers may deviate from optimal capital structures because of underdiversified human capital (e.g., 
Fama (1980)) or to inflate their control (e.g., Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988)).  Some existing 
evidence is consistent with Stulz’s (1988) theory that managers take on excessive leverage to increase the 
voting power of their equity (e.g., Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997)).  The findings by Jung, Kim and 
Stulz (1996) support the view that agency problems make some firms issue equity when a debt issuance 
would have been better for firm value.   
Table 6 reports our evidence on blockholder impact for three different leverage measures: book 
leverage, long term book leverage, and market leverage.  Across all measures, we find that the coefficient 
on the instrumented block indicator variable is negative, although only the one for long-term book 
leverage is significant (at the 10%-level).  This coefficient implies 3.7 percentage points lower long-term 
book leverage for firms with a large blockholder, which may be compared to a mean leverage ratio of 
21% in our sample.  Overall, there is little evidence that blockholder presence impacts firms’ capital 
structures.  This is an average effect, and if some blockholders reduce leverage while others increase it, 
the average result might be zero. From a theoretical point of view, this might be plausible because 
owners’ risk aversion and lack of diversification might point to lower leverage, while control motives   26
might favor debt financing over equity issues. The results are also consistent with the absence of any 
effect of large shareholders on capital structure. 
5.3.3.  Resources and payout policy   
Table 7 reports evidence on the effect of large shareholders on payout policy and cash holdings.  
In column (1), we study the total payout ratio (dividends and repurchases scaled by EBITDA).
23  The 
estimated coefficient on the instrumented block indicator is positive and significant.  Hence, large 
shareholders appear to cause firms to substantially increase their total payout.  The effect is large. A block 
in a firm is estimated to approximately double the payout ratio compared to the sample mean.  Moreover, 
the estimated error term correlation between the first and second stage equations is negative and 
significant, which suggests that the blockholders we analyze tend to select firms with low payout ratios 
compared to other similar firms.  But conditional on selecting these low payout firms, blockholders seem 
to cause a significant increase in the amount paid out to shareholders.
24   
We next consider block impact on corporate cash holdings.  In column (2), we find that the 
coefficient on the block indicator is -0.049 (significant at the 10%-level).  Thus, cash holdings of a firm 
with a block are smaller by 4.9 percent of total assets (sample mean cash holdings are 18%).  There is 
thus some evidence that the presence of a large shareholder in a firm reduces cash holdings by about a 
third of average holdings.  
Theory suggests that managers may prefer larger cash holdings and lower payout ratios because 
payouts reduce the amount of resources and assets under management’s control and potentially subject 
managers to more capital markets discipline (e.g., Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986)).  In analyzing 
the determinants of corporate cash holdings, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999), conclude 
that “management accumulates excess cash if it has the opportunity to do so” (p. 44).  A possible problem 
                                                      
23 Scaling the total dollar payout by book value of assets or market value of assets does not change our conclusions. 
24  In unreported regressions, we separate payouts through dividends from payouts through repurchases and find that 
the increase in payouts is mostly driven by increases in dividends. One possible explanation is that dividends are a 
firmer commitment for management (e.g., Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000)).     27
with excess cash, as found by Harford (1999), is that it may allow management to pursue acquisitions 
which do not increase shareholder value.  Our evidence suggests that blockholder monitoring restrains 
managers from such resource grabbing.  
5.3.4.  Managerial compensation and governance  
Table 8 reports evidence on the impact of large shareholders on managerial compensation 
contracts and governance structures related to a firm’s board.  In column (1), where the dependent 
variable is the log of total CEO pay, the coefficient on the instrumented block indicator variable is -0.96, 
significant at the 1%-level, implying that CEO pay is reduced by 0.8 of one standard deviation in the 
presence of a blockholder, which for the typical CEO corresponds to about $1.5 million annually in lower 
pay.  The estimated error term correlation between the first and second stage equations is positive (0.540) 
and significant at the 1%-level, suggesting that large shareholders seem to target firms with more 
generous executive pay packages compared to those of otherwise similar firms.
25  
This large effect of blockholders seems consistent with the joint hypotheses that CEOs extract 
rents through compensation (e.g., Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000, 
2001) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004)), and that blockholder monitoring can mitigate or eliminate 
such agency problems.  Note that firm heterogeneity may be important, for example if shareholders target 
poorly managed firms. We cannot infer that firms without blockholders would respond with drastic pay 
reductions if a blockholder appeared. 
We next analyze the composition of pay.  In column (2), we find that incentive pay is a 
significantly smaller fraction of total compensation by 0.446 with a blockholder present in the firm.  The 
reduction in total CEO pay because of large shareholder presence is almost all in terms of the incentive 
pay component.  Many CEOs of large U.S. public firms receive $1M in cash pay for tax reasons, which 
                                                      
25 Whatever selection bias affects OLS results would seem unlikely to cloud these large estimated effects of blocks 
on CEO pay. Indeed, CEO pay is one of the few variables where OLS results are significant in the same direction as 
our instrumental variables (this is consistent with findings in Bertrand and Mullainthan (2003) that blockholders 
reduce CEO pay). See Table 10 below for a systematic comparison of OLS and instrumental estimates.   28
may induce a mechanical relation between incentive pay and pay levels (incentive compensation is a 
lower fraction of the total pay package for CEOs with lower total compensation).  This could explain our 
finding. Alternatively, the evidence of less incentive pay in a firm with a blockholder is consistent with 
substitution of different governance mechanisms.  Firms with a large shareholder as a monitor do not 
require as much pay-for-performance sensitivity to align the interests of owners and management as do 
firms with no block.   
We also analyze the impact of large shareholders on a firm’s board composition.  A seat on the 
board may provide a blockholder with non-public information about the firm as well as opportunities to 
influence firm decisions. .  In column (3), where the dependent variable is the number of outside directors 
of the firm, the coefficient on the block indicator variable is 2.1, significant at the 1%-level.  A block 
increases the number of outside directors by two, which may be compared to the mean number of 
outsiders of 7.44 among the firms in our sample.
26  This evidence suggests that large shareholders monitor 
firms by either serving on the board of directors themselves, or by supporting other outside directors.
27   
5.3.5.  Liquidity and risk 
Theory suggests that a potential cost of a large shareholder in a firm is reduced liquidity in the 
firm’s publicly traded shares (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Bolton and von Thadden (1998)).  Table 
9 reports our evidence for three variables: trading volume, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure, and share 
price volatility.  We find that a large shareholder in a firm causes the firm’s shares to see lower trading 
volume, have lower volatility, and be less liquid.  These effects are significant at the 1%-level and the 
magnitudes are large.  For example, for the trading volume regression in column (1), the estimated 
regression coefficient on the instrumented block indicator is -0.004, implying that the presence of a 
                                                      
26 Outside directors are often thought of as positive from a governance perspective (see e.g. Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) who report significantly positive share-price reactions surrounding outside director appointments).  But 
researchers have not found much significant evidence of an effect of outside directors on longer-term firm 
performance measures (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2002)), possibly because of the 
endogeneity of board composition (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)).   
27 Overall board size increases as well (not reported). As a consequence, when using the fraction of outside directors 
as the dependent variable, the individual non-managerial large shareholder variable is statistically insignificant.   29
blockholder causes a fall in trading volume by 0.6 standard deviations.  The evidence of lower trading 
volume may suggest that large shareholders mechanically reduce liquidity by keeping shares off the stock 
market, by shrinking the float and lowering noise trading. However, the likely drop in float is much 
smaller   than the estimated drop in trading volume. A possible additional source of lower volume (and 
higher illiquidity) is the presence of privately informed traders.  This result supports theoretical 
predictions by, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and also Bhide (1993). They argue that large 
shareholders who reduce agency problems by monitoring management may also reduce stock liquidity by 
increasing informational asymmetries.  In the context of liquidity, our empirical evidence suggests that 
the cost of the presence of a large shareholder significantly outweighs any potential benefits for small 
shareholders.   
The evidence also indirectly supports theories arguing that stock market liquidity may reduce the 
cost of creating a block (e.g., Maug (1998)).  The estimated error term correlation between the first and 
second stage equations in the first and second columns are significant at the 1%-level, suggesting that 
large shareholders target firms whose stocks are more liquid compared to those of other firms.  Because 
these selection effects are strong, it is important to take them into account when empirically analyzing 
block impact on liquidity.
28  The block effects on stock liquidity highlight that there are costs of large 
shareholders which accompany the benefits of improved monitoring of management and reduction of 
agency problems.   
Column (3) suggests that stock price volatility falls when a firm has an individual non-managerial 
block, although the effect is less dramatic than the volume and liquidity effects. A block is predicted to 
reduce annual volatility by 7.5%, which is a little less than a fifth of average and median values. This is 
consistent with large shareholders influencing corporate policies in a conservative direction. 
                                                      
28 Below, we discuss comparisons of OLS and instrumental coefficient estimates (see Table 10 below). Only for one 
of these dependent variables (trading volume) is the OLS coefficient significant and of the same sign as the 
instrumental variables estimate, and in that case it is much smaller. This is an indication of the selection effects.   30
5.4. Robustness checks  
We have performed several robustness checks.  One concern is that the significance of our 
instrument is driven by a few states with the most extreme wealth densities.  This is not the case because 
we find that dropping the 10 states with the highest or lowest wealth density has little effect on the 
economic and statistical significance of our results.  The same is true if we drop the 10 states with the 
lowest number of firm headquarters.  A related concern is that New York City is driving all our results.  
Many wealthy individuals may consider New York City an attractive city to live in, and at the same time, 
hold blocks in one of the many firms in New York.  When we exclude New York City, we find that the 
economic and statistical significance of the estimated first stage coefficient of the instrument increases.   
We have also included additional state-level control variables: a measure of state-level income 
inequality, a state of Delaware incorporation indicator variable, and the G-index of Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) as a measure of anti-takeover provisions.  We have also included fixed effects for the nine 
Census divisions (regions).  None of the variables significantly predict block presence in a firm, and none 
of them affect the estimated effect of wealth density.   
The block indicator may be proxying for non-linear firm size effects.  But when we add [Log 
(assets)]
2 and [Log (assets)]
3 in the regressions, as well as alternative measure of size such as the log of 
market value and the log of sales, our results do not change (for predicting blockholders, higher powers of 
size tend not to be significant).  Also, individual and institutional blocks may be substitutes.  We have 
added an indicator variable for the presence of a large mutual fund, money manager, or other institutional 
owner as a control, but it does not affect any of our results.   
The denominator of our instrument uses the number of firm headquarters in a state, which may be 
correlated with factors unrelated to the supply of wealthy individuals who are potential blockholders.  We 
therefore include the two components of our instrument separately in the first stage, i.e., the number of 
individuals with high net worth and one divided by the number of firm headquarters in a state.  Both   31
measures are statistically significant.  The effect of wealth is large and highly significant, showing that 
our results are not driven by the number of local firms.   
Finally, we check the robustness of our results for different classifications of large non-
managerial, individuals shareholders.  Second-generation family members who are not current or former 
officers are included in our measure, but we find that excluding these blocks does not materially affect 
our results.  Also, some blockholders who are directors do not provide their private address in firms’ 
proxy statements, but report “Same address as company.”  Excluding these does not change any of our 
results although significance is sometimes slightly reduced.   
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
We develop and test a new instrumental variable framework which allows us to separate selection 
effects from treatment effects for a large group of blockholders and to quantify their impact on several 
aspects of firm behavior.  We start by documenting that non-managerial individual shareholders hold 
blocks in firms that are headquartered close to where they live.  We then use this empirical fact to create 
an instrumental variable (the geographic variation in the density of wealthy individuals) for the presence 
of a large shareholder in a publicly traded U.S. firm.  This instrument predicts the presence of a block in a 
firm with surprising power, and it is robust to the inclusion of variables that vary geographically, reducing 
concerns about its validity.   
Our evidence contributes in three ways to existing research on blockholders and more generally 
to corporate governance research.  First, we find that blocks are not randomly allocated to firms, but are 
systematically allocated based on where the benefits to additional monitoring are more significant.  This 
result confirms a suspicion about block ownership endogeneity that researchers have had at least since 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985).  Importantly, the non-randomness of blocks matters.  The inferences about the 
impact of large shareholders change significantly once we control for selection effects.  Table 10 
summarizes this result by showing that OLS estimates of blockholder effects combine selection and 
treatment effects. For example, while ROS is positively affected by a block according to our instrumental   32
variables estimates, the LS effect is negative and insignificant. We infer that blocks are more likely in 
firms with otherwise low profitability, but that the presence of a blockholder tends to raise profits (back 
toward the mean).  
After controlling for block selection effects, we find that large shareholders impact a broad set of 
firm policies in addition to performance.  The presence of a large shareholder reduces the firm’s 
investments, reduces corporate cash holdings, increases payouts to shareholders, and reduces total top-
executive pay.  These results are economically and statistically significant.  Firms with blockholders are 
also found to have more outside directors on their boards.  Many theories predict that large shareholders 
mitigate agency problems between managers and owners by monitoring of management, but our paper is 
first to show that blocks cause changes in firm behavior which are consistent with theories of 
blockholders as monitors.   
Finally, we find that large shareholders come with costs as well as benefits.  While large 
shareholders are improving firm performance through monitoring, we also find costs of their presence to 
other shareholders.  One cost is a less liquid publicly traded stock because of a smaller float, and because 
the presence of privately informed blockholders who might sell, increases informational asymmetries and 
as a result increases illiquidity, consistent with theoretical predictions (e.g., Bhide (1993)).  
We want to recognize some limitations of our analysis.  We have sidestepped the issue of how 
large shareholders other than individuals, e.g., institutions, impact corporate performance and policies, 
because our instrument is not expected to (and does not) predict the presence of such owners.  It is 
perhaps even more challenging to identify a valid instrument for the presence of institutional investors 
than for individual non-management blocks.  Also, we have not analyzed interactions of individual blocks 
with other governance mechanisms because testable predictions have not been worked out theoretically 
(see Zwiebel (1995) for an exception) and we are concerned about reintroducing endogeneity issues in the 
analysis.  In addition, our empirical framework does not separate the effect of the presence of a large 
shareholder from the threat of future block presence in a firm.  As suggested by Manne (1965), the threat 
of actions by blockholders can influence managerial behavior, and if firms in high wealth density areas   33
face a higher threat of block creation, this may partly explain our results.  Finally, in the absence of a 
unified structural model from which theoretical predictions can be derived and tested, we cannot say with 
certainty whether the levels of, e.g., payout and investment in firms with blockholders are closer to the 
optimal levels that would prevail in a friction-less financial system.   34
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Assets (log)  Log of total assets (Compustat item 6) 
Average share price  Mean daily closing share price previous year 
Cash holdings  Cash and short-term investments (item 1) divided by lagged net property, plant, and 
equipment (item 8) 
CEO incentive pay   Fraction of toal CEO pay (Execucomp item TDC1) that is paid in either stock or 
options 
CEO pay (log)   Log of the sum of cash salary, cash bonus, and the Black-Scholes value of options 
granted during a fiscal year to the CEO (Execucomp item TDC1) 
Dividend yield  Ratio of the sum of common dividends (item 21) and preferred dividends (item 19) 
over book value of common equity (item 60)  
Dividend payer   Indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the sum of common dividends (item 21) and 
preferred dividends (item 19) > 0, and 0 otherwise 
Firm age  Log of months since first listing on stock exchange 
Illiquidity   Yearly average of absolute daily return divided by daily dollar volume, as calculated 
by Amihud (2002). Data come from CRSP 
Industry fixed effects   The 10 Fama-French industries, FF10 
Institutional block ownership  Aggregate ownership by institutions, counting only blocks of 5% or more of common 
equity 
Investment  Capital expenditures (item 128) divided by lagged net property, plant, and equipment 
(item 8) 
Lagged return   Stock market return over the previous fiscal year 
Leverage   Long-term debt (item 9) plus current liabilities (item 34) divided by long-term debt 
plus current liabilities plus book value of common equity (item 60) (book leverage) 
or divided by long-term debt plus current liabilities plus market value of common 
equity (market leverage) 
Market capitalization  Number of shares outstanding times calendar year closing price (item 25 x item 199) 
Nasdaq listing  Dummy variable equal to one for firms listed on NASDAQ, and zero otherwise 
Number of outsiders on board  Number of non-affiliated directors on firm’s board, from the IRRC director database 
Payout ratio  Common dividends (item 21) plus dollar expenditures on the purchase of common 
and preferred stock (item 115) minus the reduction in the value of the net number of 
preferred shares outstanding (changes in item 56) divided by EBITDA 
Payout yield  Common dividends (item 21) plus dollar expenditures on the purchase of common 
and preferred stock (item 115) minus the reduction in the value of the net number of 
preferred shares outstanding (changes in item 56) divided by book value of assets 
Return on assets  Ratio of EBITDA (item 18) divided by lagged total assets (item 6) 
Return on sales  Ratio of EBITDA (item 18) divided by lagged total sales (item 12) 
Sales growth  Net sales (item 12) divided by lagged net sales, minus 1 
S, G & A   Selling, general, and administrative expenses (item 189) divided by sales (item 12) 
Trading volume   Yearly average of number of shares traded per month divided by total shares 
outstanding 
Volatility  Annualized standard deviation of monthly share price, calculated over previous 24 
months  
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Appendix B: Wealth levels relative to block holdings 
In this appendix, we consider the resources of high net worth individuals, relative to the size of 
the equity blockholdings we study (see section 4.2).  We use the fact that empirical wealth distributions 
closely follow a power law, at least for the top 5-10% of individuals by wealth (e.g., Levy and Solomon 
(1997) and Klass, Biham, Levy, Malcai and Solomon (2006)).  Such a power law implies a particular 
relationship between the wealth rank of an individual and her wealth.  Using this empirical fact, we may 
estimate the number of people of any particular wealth level (as long as it is in the top 5-10% of 
individuals) using the number of people above the cut-off for the SOI wealth data.   
We use the power law parameter of 1.36, as estimated by Levy and Solomon (1997), to estimate 
the top of the wealth distribution.
29  We infer the number and wealth of the very wealthiest individuals in 
each state in 1998.  Table B 1 shows our estimates of the wealth distributions for Oregon (with the 
median number of millionaires: 27,000), Georgia (75
th percentile: 64,000), New York (2
nd highest: 
243,000), and California (highest: 412,000).  In these four states, the estimated wealth of the hundred 
richest individuals was $17.4 billion, $32.8 billion, $87.4 billion, and $128.8 billion, respectively.  The 
estimated number of ultra-wealthy individuals – with more than $100 million in personal wealth – is 51 in 
Oregon, 122 in Georgia, 463 in New York and 785 in California.  The table also reports the number of 
sample firms in each state, the total market value of equity of these firms, and the median, average, and 
largest firm market values in 1999.  Five percent of the median firm’s market value across the four states 
is $43 million, $70 million, $171 million, and $58 million, respectively, and there are an estimated 162, 
198, 223, and 1,659 individuals with enough estimated wealth to buy such a stake if they invested all their 
wealth.  These estimates suggest that there is enough money in the hands of the wealthiest individuals for 
them to potentially play a significant role as owners of large blocks of shares.   
                                                      
29 Levy and Solomon (1997) use data from the 1996 Forbes 400 list of the richest people in the U.S. to back out the 
parameter of 1.36.  Klass et al. (2006) calculate an average parameter of 1.49 using the Forbes 400 lists during 1988-
2003.  We use the 1996 parameter as it predates our sample.    40
The estimates in Table B 1 depend on the accuracy of the power law distribution.  The following 
exercise shows that an extrapolation using the power law distribution works remarkably well and that the 
variable we use tracks the whole top of the wealth distribution, including its far tail.  Forbes publishes an 
annual list of the wealthiest Americans and their principal residences.  The minimum wealth required to 
make the 1998 list was $430 million. We count the number of high net worth individuals in each state.  
We then use the power law and the SOI data to predict, for each state, the number of individuals with 
wealth greater than $430 million.  Finally, we compare our estimates to the actual number of ultra-
wealthy individuals.  Figure 2 plots the actual against the predicted number of individuals with more than 
$430 million in each state.  The correlation coefficient is 0.89 and highly statistically significant.  Thus, 
the power law distribution can be used to accurately predict the geographic distribution of ultra-wealthy 
individuals using the distribution of moderately wealthy individuals.   
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Table B 1: Estimated wealth distributions  
The table shows estimates of the number and wealth of high net worth individuals for four U.S. states 
(Oregon, Georgia, New York, California).  The wealth estimates are based on data from the Internal 
Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (SOI) data which reports the estimated number of individuals with 
a high net worth ($1M and up) in 1998.  The wealth of subsamples of these individuals (100 richest, 
number with $100 million or more in net wealth) is estimated assuming individual net wealth follows a 
power law distribution with 
36 . 1 / 1    n A Wn for wealth W, and individual rank n.  A is a constant.  The 
parameter of 1.36 is estimated by Levy and Solomon (1997) (LS (1997) below).  The 1999 end-of-year 
market value and number of listed firms are constructed from Compustat data.  The sample is non-dual 
class S&P 1500 firms. 
 
   Oregon  Georgia New York  California  Data source 
Number of individuals with a high net worth  27,000  64,000  243,000  412,000  SOI (1995) 
Wealth of 100 richest individuals ($M)  17,367  32,759  87,373  128,817  Estimate using  
  their wealth as fraction of state   140%  8%  5%  9%  LS (1997) 
 market  value  1999           
Number of individuals with $100M in wealth  51  122  463  785  Estimate using  
  their wealth as fraction of state   110%  9%  8%  18%  LS (1997) 
 market  value  1999           
Number of sample firms in state (1999)  7  26  70  153  Compustat  
Total market value of equity in 1999 ($M)   12,420  392,538 1,827,770  1,420,483  Compustat  
Median market value in 1999  5% ($M)  43 70  171  58  Compustat  
Average market value in 1999  5% ($M)  89  755  1,015  597  Compustat  
Largest market value in 1999  5% ($M)  259  7,200  17,500  9,700  Compustat  
          
No. of individuals with enough wealth to buy 
5% of:         
Estimates using LS 
(1997) 
  median firm in state  162  198  223  1,659   
  average firm in state  61  8  20  69   
 2
nd largest firm in state  27  0.6  0.6  1.9   
  largest firm in state  14.1  0.4  0.4  1.6   
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Figure 1: The geographic distribution of high net worth individuals  
The figure shows estimates of the number of high net worth individuals per Compustat firm headquarter 
for each U.S. state.  The wealth data are from the Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (SOI) 
data which report the estimated number of individuals with a high net worth in 1995.  The data for firms’ 
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Figure 2: Actual versus predicted number of individuals on the Forbes 400 list 
The figure plots state by state, the actual number of individuals on the Forbes list of the wealthiest 
Americans (in 1998) against the predicted number of individuals.  We use the wealth data from the 
Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income (SOI) database (1998) and the power law distribution 
with a parameter of 1.36 estimated by Levy and Solomon (1997) to predict the number of individuals on 
the list (minimum wealth required to be on the Forbes 1998 list was $430 million).  The correlation 
coefficient between actual and predicted number of ultra-wealthy individuals is 0.89.   
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Figure 3: Frequency of individual blocks by U.S. state 
The figure plots the frequency of large, individually held, non-managerial blocks in each state (across all 
sample years) against the density of high net worth individuals in 1995. Each circle represents one state. 
The area of a circle is proportional to the number of firms in the state. The dashed line represents the 
regression line from a weighted least squares regression (weights are the number of firms). This 
regression has an estimated intercept of 0.031 (standard error 0.026), an estimated slope of 0.190 
(standard error 0.051). The slope is significantly different from zero at the 0.1%-level. The adjusted R–
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Table 1: Distance between large shareholders and firms’ headquarters 
The table shows summary statistics for the distance in miles between the location of a blockholder and the 
headquarters of the firm in which the block is held for four different types of large shareholders.  The four 
types of blockholders are non-managerial individuals, managers (both current and former), mutual funds, 
and money managers.  The summary statistics are based on firm-year observations. If a firm has multiple 
blockholders of the same category in a given year, the distance in miles is calculated as the average 
distance between firm headquarters and the locations of the blockholders. Firm-years are only included in 
the summary statistics below if there is at least one blockholder of the respective category. The sample is 
approximately 6,000 firm-year observations of non-dual class S&P 1500 firms during the period 1996-
2001, excluding financial firms and utilities.  Blockholders are entities that own at least 5% of the 
outstanding shares.  The blockholder zip codes are hand-collected from proxy statements.  The firms’ zip 
codes come from the Execucomp database, the Compact Disclosure discs, or are hand-collected from 
proxy statements.  The distances are calculated for U.S. based blockholders (excluding Alaska and 
Hawaii) only, using latitude and longitude data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer Place and Zip 
Code Database.  The indicator variable “Same State” is equal to one if the blockholder and firm 
headquarters are located in the same state, and zero otherwise. 
 
   Distance  in  miles   
Type of blockholder  N  Mean  Median  Same State 
Non-managerial individual  715  385.4  28.5  61.3% 
Managers 1,329  52.1  0  93.2% 
Mutual funds  4,102  1,158.5  1,121.38  9.5% 
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Table 2: Summary statistics  
The table shows sample summary statistics.  Panel A shows the number of observations and frequency for 
four types of blockholders: Non-managerial individuals, managers (both current and former), mutual 
funds, and money managers.  Panel B shows mean, median and standard deviation for all other variables.  
The sample size (N) varies across variables because of data availability and because outliers are excluded 
from regressions. All variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 
1500 firms during the period 1996-2001. 
Panel A: Blockholders  
Type of blockholder  N  Frequency 
Non-managerial individuals  5984  0.118 
Management   5984  0.219 
Mutual funds  5984  0.677 
Money managers  5984  0.305 
 
Panel B: Regression variables  
Variables   N  Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
Firm age  5979  24.0  20.1  19.13 
ROA 5787  0.047  0.055  0.104 
ROS 5784  0.035  0.047  0.166 
S,G&A 5318  0.251  0.213  0.179 
Investment 5632  0.282  0.221  0.221 
Leverage, BV  5751  0.252  0.246  0.182 
Leverage, long-term only, BV  5755  0.210  0.195  0.169 
Leverage, MV  5744  0.278  0.220  0.277 
Total payout ratio  5377  0.257  0.202  0.355 
Cash holdings  5771  0.146  0.043  0.270 
Number of outsiders on board  5584  7.440  7.000  2.812 
CEO pay (log)  5092  7.820  7.775  1.188 
CEO incentive pay  5092  0.512  0.553  0.285 
Trading volume  5966  0.006  0.004  0.007 
Annualized stock return  5951  0.054  0.089  0.475 
Volatility 5893  0.450  0.392  0.248 
Illiquidity 5890  0.031  0.004  0.088   47
  
Table 3: First stage results  
The table shows results from linear probability models and probit regressions of three large shareholder 
variables on measures of the density of high net worth individuals in a state in 1995 and controls.  The 
dependent variables are defined as follows. The large shareholder dummy variable is equal to one if an 
individual non-managerial large shareholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise (columns 1 through 
4).  Block ownership is the percentage ownership by individual non-managerial blockholders (column 5).  
The managerial block dummy variable is equal to one if a large individual managerial shareholder is 
present in the firm, and zero otherwise (column 6).  The Fund / MM block dummy variable is equal to one 
if a mutual fund or money manager is present in a firm, and zero otherwise (column 7). The sample is 
non-dual class S&P 1500 firms during the period 1996-2001.  Blockholders are entities that own at least 
5% of outstanding shares.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  Robust standard errors 
(shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
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Table 3 – cont’d  
 




Fund / MM 
block dummy
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
Regression  type  OLS  Probit Probit Probit  OLS  Probit  Probit 
Density of high net worth 
individuals, 1995 
0.190*** 0.892*** 0.728***   2.29***  0.281  -0.291 
(0.060) (0.250) (0.281)    (0.560) (0.216)  (0.212) 
Wealth per listed firm, 1995        0.513***      
     (0.174)       
Lagged return      -0.071  -0.071  -0.129  0.008  -0.116*** 
     (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.212)  (0.036)  (0.052) 
Log (assets, book value)      -0.159*** -0.158*** -0.304*** -0.221*** -0.142*** 
     (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.069)  (0.042)  (0.027) 
Age     0.016*  0.016*  0.057**  -0.007  -0.009 
     (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
Age squared      -0.00021 -0.00020 -0.0008*** -0.0002  0.00008 
      (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007) 
Sales growth      0.132*  0.124*  0.182  0.037  0.131** 
     (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.315)  (0.065)  (0.063) 
Return on assets (ROA)      -0.250  -0.224  -0.903  0.690***  -0.526 
     (0.309)  (0.311)  (0.870)  (0.215)  (0.447) 
Year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.008  N/A N/A N/A  0.026 0.035  N/A 
           
N  5,972 5,972 5,754 5,754 5,754  5,754  5,754   49
Table 4: First stage results with state-level controls   
The table shows probit regressions of a blockholder indicator variable on the density of high net worth 
individuals in 1995 and other variables that vary at the state level. The dependent variable is equal to one 
if a large individual non-managerial shareholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise. The sample is 
non-dual class S&P 1500 firms during the period 1996-2001.  The state-level variables are defined in 
Section 3.3. Each specification includes the firm-level controls of Table 3, column 3.  Robust standard 
errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regression type  Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
Density of high net worth 
individuals 
0.709** 0.725*** 0.657** 0.737*** 0.626** 
(0.279) (0.281) (0.283) (0.279)  (0.2683) 
Population density  -0.005      -0.004 
  (0.005)      (0.004) 
Corporate tax rate (state)   0.011    0.014 
   (0.014)    (0.014) 
Per capita income     -0.001  -0.001 
     (0.002)  (0.002) 
Educational attainment - % high 
school graduates 
    0.003  0.003 
    (0.005)  (0.005) 
       
Firm control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N  5,754 5,754 5,754 5,754 5,754 
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 Table 5: Operating performance and large shareholders 
The table shows results from the second stage regression of operating performance measures on the 
instrumented large shareholder dummy and control variables. The large shareholder dummy is equal to 
one if a large individual non-managerial shareholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise.  It is 
instrumented in the first stage regression with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995.  The last 
two rows of the table show the coefficient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals 
from the first stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy on the density measure and controls.  
ˆ   is the estimated correlation between first and second stage error terms.  The sample is non-dual class 
S&P 1500 firms during the period 1996-2001.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  
Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 
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Dependent variable  ROA  ROS  S, G & A  Investment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Second  stage  results      
Large shareholder dummy   0.0371*  0.0782***  -0.0625  -0.0704** 
[instrumented]  (0.0221) (0.0251) (0.0390) (0.0297) 
Age   0.0006*  0.0004  -0.002  -0.0036*** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Age squared (/1000)  -0.008*  -0.008**  0.00002  0.00004*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.00001)  (0.00001) 
Assets, log  -0.0024  0.0048*  -0.015***  -0.024*** 
 (0.0023)  (0.0026)  (0.004)  (0.0036) 
Sales growth  0.0163***  0.0025  0.010  0.106*** 
 (0.0040)  (0.0053)  (0.011)  (0.027) 
Dividend payer dummy  0.0008  -0.002     
 (0.0040)  (0.005)     
Dividend yield  0.327***  0.219***     
 (0.044)  (0.057)     
Lagged ROA      0.038  0.372*** 
     (0.039)  (0.046) 
Lagged return  0.033***  0.027***  0.009  0.059*** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimated  ˆ    -0.250 -0.449 0.282  0.184 
Chi-square test ( ˆ 0   )  3.01* 10.73*** 3.61*  6.83*** 
N 5,503  5,509  5,172  5,485 
      
First  stage  results      
Density of high net worth individuals  0.722***  0.725***  1.013***  0.887*** 
 (0.281)  (0.257)  (0.360)  (0.313) 
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Table 6: Capital structure and large shareholders 
The table shows results from the second stage regression of three measures of leverage on a large 
shareholder dummy and control variables. The large shareholder dummy is equal to one if a large 
individual non-managerial shareholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise. It is instrumented in the 
first stage regression with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995.  The last two rows of the 
table show the coefficient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals from the first 
stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy on the density measure and controls.   ˆ   is the 
estimated correlation between first and second stage error terms.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 
firms during the period 1996-2001.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  Robust 
standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable  Leverage, BV  Long term leverage, BV  Leverage, MV 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Second stage results       
Large shareholder dummy  -0.0323  -0.0372*  -0.0330 
[instrumented] (0.0246)  (0.0222)  (0.0436) 
Controls (first, second stage)  Age, age squared, log (assets), sales growth, ROA, dummy for 
dividend payers, lagged return 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimated  ˆ    0.142 0.138 0.029 
Chi-square test ( ˆ 0   )  5.42* 5.06**  1.13 
N 5,654  5,657  5,555 
      
First stage results       
Density of high net worth individuals  0.692**  0.684**  0.747*** 
 (0.286)  (0.284)  (0.292) 
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Table 7: Payout policy, cash holdings, and large shareholders 
The table shows results from the second stage regression of five measures of payout policy on a large 
shareholder dummy and control variables. The large shareholder dummy is equal to one if a large 
individual non-managerial shareholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise. It is instrumented in the 
first stage regression with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995.  The last two rows of the 
table show the coefficient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals from the first 
stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy on the density measure and controls.   ˆ   is the 
estimated correlation between first and second stage error terms.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 
firms during the period 1996-2001.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  Robust 
standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable  Total payout ratio  Cash holdings 
 (1)  (2) 
Second stage results     
Large shareholder dummy  0.265***  -0.0488* 
[instrumented] (0.091)  (0.0258) 
Controls (first, second stage)  Age, age squared, log (assets), sales 
growth, ROA, lagged return 
    
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Estimated  ˆ    -0.336  0.120 
Chi-square test ( ˆ 0   )  5.58**  2.30 
N 5,178  5,461 
    
First stage results     
Density of high net worth 
individuals 
0.624**  0.782*** 
(0.269)  (0.284) 
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Table 8: Managerial compensation, governance mechanisms, and large shareholders 
The table shows results from the second stage regression of CEO pay and board structure on a large 
shareholder dummy and control variables. The large shareholder dummy is equal to one if a large 
individual non-managerial shareholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise. It is instrumented in the 
first stage regression with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995.  The last two rows of the 
table show the coefficient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals from the first 
stage probit regression of the large shareholder dummy on the density measure and controls.   ˆ   is the 
estimated correlation between first and second stage error terms.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 
firms during the period 1996-2001.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  Robust 
standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable  CEO pay (log)  CEO incentive pay   No. of outsiders on board 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Second stage results       
Large shareholder dummy  -0.960***  -0.446***  2.112*** 
[instrumented] (0.192)  (0.048)  (0.156) 
Controls (first, second stage)  Age, age squared, log (assets), sales growth, ROA, dummy for dividend payers, 
lagged return) 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimated  ˆ    0.540 0.741  -0.368 
Chi-square test ( ˆ 0   )  15.76*** 56.14***  1.83 
N 4,936  4,947  5,368 
      
First stage results       
Density of high net worth   0.922***  0.620**  0.480*** 
individuals (0.308)  (0.278)  (0.174) 
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Table 9: Liquidity and large shareholders 
The table shows results from the second stage regression of measures of liquidity on a large shareholder 
dummy and control variables. The large shareholder dummy is equal to one if a large individual non-
managerial shareholder is present in the firm, and zero otherwise. It is instrumented in the first stage 
regression with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995.  The last two rows of the table show the 
coefficient and standard error for the density of high net worth individuals from the first stage probit 
regression of the large shareholder dummy on the density measure and controls.   ˆ   is the estimated 
correlation between first and second stage error terms.  The sample is non-dual class S&P 1500 firms 
during the period 1996-2001.  All other variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  Robust standard 
errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
 
Dependent variable  Trading volume  Illiquidity  Stock price volatility 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Second stage results       
Large shareholder dummy  -0.0039***  0.124***  -0.075*** 
[instrumented] (0.0009)  (0.017)  (0.028) 
Controls (first, second stage)  Age, age squared, log (assets), sales growth, lagged return, ROA, 
dummy for dividend payers, institutional block ownership, dummy of 
Nasdaq membership, average share price 
Other controls  Volatility Trading  volume  Volatility, Trading 
volume 
     
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Estimated  ˆ    0.364 -0.667 0.290 
Chi-square test ( ˆ 0   )  145.11*** 22.09***  11.15*** 
N 5,636  5,633  5,614 
     
First stage results       
Density of high net worth individuals  0.824***  0.388*  0.578** 
(0.277) (0.218) (0.273) 
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Table 10: Comparison of instrumental variable and OLS estimates  
The table compares instrumental variable (IV) and OLS estimates of non-managerial individual 
blockholder effects on firms.  Each reported number corresponds to a separately estimated coefficient on 
the large shareholder dummy variable for the different dependent variables.  We use the same control 
variables in each regression as those in Tables 6-10.  The IV column shows the estimated second stage 
coefficients on the instrumented large non-managerial individual shareholder dummy variable. It is 
instrumented with the density of high net worth individuals in 1995.  The OLS column shows the 
corresponding OLS estimate of the large non-managerial individual shareholder dummy variable.  All 
variables are defined in the Data Appendix.  Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered 
by state.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
 
Dependent variables  IV   OLS  
ROA 0.0362*  0.0138 
ROS 0.0782***  -0.0021 
S, G & A  -0.0624  0.0082 
Investment   -0.0704*  -0.0071 
Leverage, BV   -0.0323  0.0094 
Long term leverage, BV   -0.0372*  -0.0014 
Leverage, MV  -0.0330  0.0008 
Total payout ratio  0.265***  0.058** 
Cash holdings   -0.0488*  -0.0160* 
CEO pay (log)   -0.960***  -0.193*** 
CEO incentive pay (log)   -0.446***  -0.049*** 
Number of outside directors   2.112***  0.017 
Trading volume   -0.0039***  -0.0014*** 
Volatility -0.075***  0.0072 
Illiquidity   0.124**  0.0014 
 
 